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Brendan Howe
East Asia is a region deeply affected by colonial, ideological, and national wars. At the 
level of international governance, security organizations in the region have looked 
to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing 
non-intervention; while domestic governance has emphasized national interest 
and strength in terms of security and economic growth. East Asian challenges to 
normative universalism can be defined in cultural, economic, and political terms. 
This article, however, considers not only the threats to human security in East Asia, 
but also the roles that East Asian actors play in protecting and promoting human 
security, noting that under certain conditions, East Asian perspectives may be able 
to secure, in terms of human security, better results than could be achieved through 
extra-regional intervention.
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Introduction
This article addresses the epistemological traditions and physical experiences 
which have helped shape a uniquely East Asian take on governance and 
policymaking, as well as assessing the contributions by the major regional actors 
to human security in theory and practice. This is followed by consideration of 
some of the obstacles to providing safe havens free from fear, want, and indignity 
for the most vulnerable in the region. The case studies selected are those with 
major ongoing human security issues, but which have received significant 
attention from Western and East Asian actors attempting to address these 
challenges.
East Asia (including the sub-regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia) 
is a region deeply affected by conflict. Colonial, ideological, and national wars 
have left their scars and legacies, including disputed borders and divided loyalties. 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, states in the region have looked to minimize 
the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-
intervention, while domestic governance has emphasized national interest and 
strength in terms of security and economic growth. The constitutive documents 
of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) also reflect this 
state-centric focus. East Asia, therefore, has been dominated by the national 
security paradigm, the principles of absolute sovereignty, and non-interference 
in domestic affairs, with humanitarian assistance or intervention regarded as, 
potentially, illegitimate interference (Acharya 2002, 377). 
Meanwhile, the very idea of human security can be regarded as a Western 
legacy, stemming from liberalism (Rothschild 1995, 60-61); and thereby 
challenged by claims of cultural specificity (Acharya 2001, 1). Although perhaps 
no other region on earth is as culturally and socio-economically diverse, 
opposition to Western liberal or universal cosmopolitan values emanating from 
Asia has tended to be identified collectively as the challenge of “Asian values” 
(Khong 1997). While the Asian values debate per se has run out of steam and the 
paradigm defined as such has been discredited by association with authoritarian 
governments in East Asia, there nevertheless remain clear differences in 
interpretation of international norms relating to human security, peacebuilding 
and the responsibility to protect (R2P).
The Asian challenge to normative universalism can be seen in cultural, 
economic, and political terms. Culturally, it asserts that the Western liberal 
or universalist approach ignores the specific cultural traditions and historical 
circumstances of Asian societies, whose interpretations of human rights are 
different from those in the West. Economically, it maintains that the priority 
of developing Asian societies has to be the eradication of poverty. Politically it 
calls into question the motives of the West accusing them of using human rights 
merely as an instrument for advancing Western economic or security interests—
“power politics in disguise” and a shallow pretense for the use of force against 
regimes which stand up to Western neo-imperialism (Thompson 2004, 1085).
Essentially the “West” holds a narrow view of human security, but an 
interventionary interpretation of the R2P, with the two being closely linked; 
whereas in East Asia the linkage between the two is rejected, and a broad 
conceptualization of human security along with a non-interventionary 
understanding of the R2P dominates. The following sections explore the extent 
to which there remain East Asian perspectives on human security, peacebuilding, 
and the R2P, whether these perspectives have enough in common to be 
considered an “Asian Way,” and how they diverge from Western perspectives. 
Furthermore, the article considers, through analysis of regional cases of 
insecurity, the extent to which this divergence may be beneficial, opening policy 
space for East Asian actors to protect and promote human security in the region, 
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either solely from an Asian perspective or in concert with the West.
East Asian Perspectives on Human Security, Peacebuilding, and the 
R2P
Bellamy and Drummond (2011, 196) assert that, since the turn of the millennium, 
many states in the East Asian region are moving away from traditional notions 
towards accepting a localized variant of “sovereignty as responsibility” that allows 
for criticism of domestic polices and limited diplomatic pressure in the event 
of humanitarian crises. There has been convergence on the primacy of human 
security considerations, and an acceptance of the principles of the R2P (Bellamy 
and Davies 2009, 561).
Despite a degree of convergence on R2P however, it is clear that East Asian 
states maintain a distinct understanding of what it implies and its relationship 
with human security. For instance, the Permanent Representative of South Korea 
to the UN stressed “the primary responsibility lies in the individual Government 
while the international community bears the secondary responsibility,” that R2P is 
“distinctly different from humanitarian intervention since it is based on collective 
actions, in accordance with the UN Charter,” and that “not all humanitarian 
tragedies or human rights violations can or should activate R2P” (Park 2009). 
In Japanese thinking, there is a significant difference between human security 
and R2P perspectives: “while R2P recognizes the necessity for enforcement in 
certain circumstances, human security rules it out in every occasion,” thus the 
Japanese focus is one of prevention reducing the need for intervention (Bellamy 
and Davies 2009, 552). We need first, therefore, to understand the problems 
human security champions in the East Asian region have with the universalist 
perspective championed by Western actors.
East Asian Critiques of Western Liberal Universalism
There are three main criticisms of liberal universalist approach to human security 
and peacebuilding. First, that Western “liberal” approaches in practice do not 
match the universal principles to which they aspire and from which they claim 
legitimacy, with selectivity in selection of peacebuilding activities often dictated 
by the interests of the intervening state(s) and often illiberal practices carried 
out during the intervention (Selby 2013, 57). Second, that these approaches are 
hegemonic and hierarchical in terms of both actors and issues, prioritizing what 
Western liberal societies or Western-dominated institutions think is good for the 
“benefitted” (democracy, the organization of elections, human rights and the rule 
of law, neo-liberal development, and the creation of an open market economy) 
rather than considering local circumstances and interests (Autesserre 2011, 4; 
Richmond 2006, 291-314). Third, that Western human security promotion and 
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liberal peacebuilding are essentially top-down in nature, rather than bottom-
up, and that this is unsuited to transforming conflictual relationships or building 
resilient post-crisis societies (Lederach 1998, 1999).
Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005, 69) further notes that human security at the 
personal, institutional, and structural-cultural levels can be more effectively 
realized in the process of peacebuilding if “culture and identity and an interpretive 
bottom-up approach to peacebuilding are taken into account when addressing 
the problems of marginalized individuals, groups, and communities;” and both 
material as well as socio-cultural contexts are considered critical factors. This, 
then, represents a key departure from the universalist aspirations of the Western 
liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Likewise, for John Paul Lederach (1998, 20, 94), 
peace is a dynamic social construct, which requires continuous maintenance, and 
as the greatest prospects for sustaining peace in the long-term are rooted in the 
local people and their cultures, they should be seen as resources, not recipients.
Although the concept of human security has, over the last three decades, 
become widely recognized at the theoretical level, the twin concepts of freedom 
from fear and freedom from want that remain central to human security 
discourse are at the basis of a schism within the practitioner community. 
Proponents of a “narrow” concept focus on violent threats to individuals. 
Proponents of the “broad” concept argue that the threat agenda should be 
expanded to include hunger, disease, and natural disasters because these kill far 
more people than war, genocide, and terrorism combined. Western approaches 
to the promotion of human security in East Asia have tended towards top-down 
liberal interventions, political freedoms and democracy, the rule of law, and 
narrow freedom from physical threats. Asian approaches have tended towards 
constructive engagement, broad and development-based human security, and 
non-interventionary consensual partnerships with governments to address 
challenges. These competing perspectives can perhaps best be illustrated by brief 
consideration of the related policies of the greatest champions of the paradigm in 
each region—Canada in the West, and Japan in Asia.
Canada was the first state to embrace human security as a guiding point for 
development and peace-building activities, and it has prioritized the promotion 
of human security in the post-Cold war period as part of its active international 
involvement (Bernard 2006, 233-34). Canada’s foreign policy identity self-
imaging has long been as a “helpful fixer,” “honest broker,” and “international do‐
gooder” (Bosold 2007, 175-200). As a major contributor to United Nations (UN) 
Peacekeeping Operations in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, and other 
conflict areas, the Canadian government began to advocate the need to protect 
civilians in armed conflict situations within state borders and stressed the need to 
rethink the notion of humanitarian intervention (Axworthy 1997, 183-96).
Two international governance policy initiatives reflect Canada’s rethinking 
on human security: the Ottawa Convention to Ban Anti‐Personal Landmines 
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and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy, one of the foremost champions of the paradigm, also called for 
addressing human security issues through humanitarian-inspired intervention by 
saying that human security “is going to have to be reconciled with the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states” and the concept of national 
sovereignty “cannot be absolute” (Hubert and Bonser 2001, 111-21). This stance 
led Canada to provide global leadership in the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the final report of which entitled “The 
Responsibility to Protect” dealt with questions of when to intervene, under whose 
authority, and how (ICISS 2001).
Meanwhile, constrained by its pacifist constitution and lingering animosity 
in the region over Japan’s historic role, planners have looked to non-traditional 
security policies to further Japanese interests (Howe 2010). These conditions have 
provided added impetus for successive Japanese governments to develop non-
military concepts of security and to practice them in order to play a leadership 
role in the global politico-strategic sphere. In particular, the emergence of 
the human security concept within security discourse allowed the country to 
combine its traditional regional aid operations with an initiative with global 
reach. Given internal and external structural constraints on the use of force, 
Japan has consistently tried to pursue its foreign policy through economic means, 
such as official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment and 
loans, rather than by military means. Indeed, these anti-military, pro-economic 
norms have become characteristic of Japanese foreign and security policy (Berger 
1993, 119-50). The recognition of the concept of human security in Japan is 
related to both the Asian financial crisis and the desire to play a bigger (albeit 
non-interventionary) role in international society under the concept of proactive 
pacifism (Soeya 2005; Acharya and Acharya 2000, 12).
By focusing on the economic and development aspects of human security 
and supporting wholeheartedly the broad approach outlined by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Japan has been accused of 
contributing to a schism within the paradigm and community, placing the 
Japanese approach at odds with that of Western countries such as Canada and 
the Nordic states (Edström 2008, 109-10). While human security was introduced 
to the mainstream of Japanese foreign policy by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 
1998, a similar concept was first outlined as a key foreign policy perspective and 
main objective of Japanese ODA disbursement in 1995 (Fukushima 2003, 132). 
According to a speech by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at the UN World 
Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, Japan was trying 
to create a “human-centered society” and emphasized “human-centered social 
development” as a focus of Japanese ODA (Murayama 1995), thereby further 
embedding the notion of a strategic link between development, human security, 
and Japanese foreign and state security policy.
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The recognition of the concept of human security in Japan is related to both 
the Asian financial crisis and the desire to play a bigger role in international 
society under the concept of proactive pacifism (Soeya 2005; Acharya and 
Acharya 2000, 12). The crisis had a devastating impact on Asia’s economy; 
increasing poverty and political instability and underscoring the crucial need for 
social safety nets for the poor and for a new understanding of security, focusing 
on Asian peoples rather than states (Acharya and Acharya, 2000). In the context 
of the crisis, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi noted in his opening remarks at the 
“Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow” on December 2, 1998, 
saying “I believe that we must deal with these difficulties with due consideration 
for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of ‘Human 
Security,’ and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which 
attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term 
development of our region” (Obuchi 1998a).
Obuchi committed to help Asian countries overcome crises and assist 
socially vulnerable people. He emphasized his perception of human security as 
being people-rather than state-centric, and that his understanding of human 
security was analogous to that of the UNDP. At the ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi on 
December 16, 1998, he advanced a vision of human security as “a comprehensive 
view of all threats to human survival, life, and dignity” (Obuchi 1998b). Together, 
these speeches laid the foundation for the rise to prominence of human security 
as the main pillar of Japan’s foreign policy agenda. With the fusion of human 
security and ODA, Japanese aid policy has been transformed into a vehicle for 
transporting the human security idea (Konrad 2006, 22).
An Asian Way?
While Asia as a whole, and even the East Asian region, is too diverse to be 
considered monolithic in perspectives, nevertheless there are sufficient similarities 
between the human security promotion policies of regional actors to consider 
whether there is an East Asian way of doing things. These similarities go beyond 
the simple rejection of Western liberal universalism.
As mentioned above, Japan can be considered the human security trailblazer 
of the region. Japan has been at the forefront of regional ODA, has given 
considerable impetus to the comprehensive and human security agendas, and 
has served as a major contributor to international aid and relief organizations. 
Japanese aid and human security initiatives may well be motivated by national 
interest and far from altruistic. Nevertheless, a happy coincidence exists whereby 
Japanese aid has had a significant positive impact on human security and 
development in the region while simultaneously fulfilling Japanese strategic 
agendas. This can be seen in the analysis of the policy impact of East Asian actors 
in cases of regional insecurity outlined below.
Knowing the apprehension of developing countries towards the interven- 
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tionary turn taken by other approaches, it is perhaps understandable that the 
Japanese government has focused on the developmental and economic aspect of 
human security. Japan’s ability to work in politically problematic and/or (post-)
conflict territories (as developed below) has been facilitated by its approach to 
human security and development, with its discursive emphasis on human security 
welcomed as a “particularly suitable replacement for Western liberal discourses 
on human rights, which are deeply unpopular in Asia and Africa” (Hynek 2012, 
70). This is still not to suggest, however, that Japanese human security promotion 
is somehow apolitical or entirely altruistic. Rather, policymakers have identified 
a niche area where Japan can punch up to its weight in the international arena, if 
not above it, the pursuance of which will promote national interest at the same 
time as improving the image of Japan as a benevolent international actor. At the 
same time, collateral benefit accrues to the human security of the most vulnerable 
sections of Asian societies, and the concept is elevated on the global stage through 
Japanese support. As pointed out by Edström (2011, 25), “it seems that countries 
pursuing policies on human security have devised them to fit policies where they 
have seen themselves having a comparative advantage.”
The reasons for Japan’s leadership in human security promotion are in fact 
three-fold: to advance niche diplomatic interests by using ODA effectively as a 
diplomatic tool; to benefit vulnerable sections of the regional community; and 
to secure bureaucratic interests by gaining public support for human security 
promotion activities (Howe 2013, 202). Japan has provided inspiration for the 
human-centered policy initiatives of other regional actors (including for strategic 
competitors), as well as supporting directly human security initiatives in the East 
Asian region.
Indeed, these elements form the nucleus of an East Asian regional way 
of promoting human security, which despite significant differences, can be 
identified as commonalities among the other major regional actors. These include 
significant geostrategic constraints upon the exertion of traditional power and 
influence; the need, therefore, to explore areas of “niche diplomacy” in terms of 
both policy orientation and geographic regional concentration where actors can 
get more bang for their buck (or Yen or Won); significant linkage with ODA and 
a broad interpretation of human security/freedom from want; and an emphasis 
on consent and rejection of intervention, thereby securing support from domestic 
constituencies in both the human security promoting agent, and the regional 
partner country.
South Korea’s status in foreign affairs is broadly recognized as being that of a 
middle power, both of its own accord as well as how it is perceived by the world, 
and in particular by its regional neighbors (Kim et al. 2018, 96; Howe 2017, 
243-48). As such, the country is in even more need of developing an impactful 
niche for its diplomacy than is Japan. In the security field, due to geopolitical 
constraints, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is unable to perform the neutral or 
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brokering role of traditional middle powers (Kalinowski and Cho 2012, 244). 
Thus, Seoul’s major policy forays and initiatives in the security realm, like 
those of Tokyo, have tended to revolve around the intersection of security and 
development, and how this intersection contributes to peacebuilding (Kim et al. 
2018, 102).
ROK human security promotion is driven in part by geostrategic constraints, 
in part by a “paying back syndrome” (Hong 2009, 24), in return for assistance 
received from the international community during and after the Korean War, 
and in part by competition with Japan (while simultaneously drawing inspiration 
from Tokyo’s initiatives). The latter may be why the South Korean government 
seldom explicitly uses the term. Elements of human security have, nonetheless, 
suffused Korea’s foreign policy. The first official occurrence of the term human 
security in Korean government documentation was in 2008 when it was used by 
the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The term was used in broader 
discussions on foreign policy without an explicit focus on ODA. MOFA and the 
Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which is the agency tasked 
primarily with the distribution and management of Korean ODA, are the only 
two government institutions that have used the term “human security” in their 
official documents.
In the security field, MOFA has discussed the concept of human security 
as involving “Individual security and safety, protection of human rights, 
and protection of individual’s basic necessities” thereby displaying a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of the term (Kim et al. 2018, 104). MOFA has 
further stated that “there is a need to cooperate at the regional and global levels 
to deal with traditional as well as non-traditional security threats” (ibid.). 
This is in line with the freedom from fear component of human security. Yet 
former Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se used human security at an international 
conference in 2013, on the theme “New Strategic Thinking: Planning for Korean 
Foreign Policy.” This was the first time a Minster of Foreign Affairs used the 
term. He stated that the global policies of the Park Administration “reflect the 
belief that peace and prosperity of South Korea and the world are indivisible, and 
that there has been a global paradigm shift which emphasizes the importance of 
human security” (ibid.). This reflected a turn towards a broader interpretation of 
human security even within the security discourse. Within the aid community of 
Korea, as might be expected, human security conceptualizations are much more 
closely aligned with freedom from want.
Although the South Korean government rarely uses the term “human 
security” in its official documents, it has embraced the concept and its 
implications for ethical foreign policy fully. For example, MOFA affirms the 
goals for ODA as economic development and poverty reduction of developing 
countries (ibid.), and commitments based on humanitarianism and sustainable 
development (ibid.). South Korea has endorsed international humanitarian 
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assistance for the protection of basic human rights of people and freedom from 
fear (ibid.). The first paragraph of Article 3 of the Framework Act on International 
Development Cooperation (2010) highlights reduction of poverty: human rights 
of women, children, and the handicapped, and gender equality; and sustainable 
development, humanitarianism, and peace (ODA Korea 2012a). MOFA included 
“strengthening of humanitarian assistance and peace building effort for the 
regions in conflict” in the six strategic goals of its ODA and aims gradually to 
increase ODA for human security and humanitarian assistance (Kim et al. 2018, 
103). Thus, the ROK has also embraced broad “Asian” development and freedom 
from want perspectives in its human security agenda.
South Korea’s humanitarian policies are based on four principles of 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, with humanitarian 
assistance defined as an intervention to help people who are victims of a natural 
disaster or conflict to meet their basic needs and rights (KDR 2018). The South 
Korean government works closely with civil society organizations in particular 
before implementing humanitarian interventions in fragile states where armed 
conflicts have caused severe damage (ibid.). And civil society representatives urge 
the government to make sure that international humanitarian assistance is in 
accordance with international humanitarian laws and norms.
So, like Japan, South Korea’s take on human security reflects significant 
geostrategic constraints upon the exertion of traditional power and influence, 
a niche diplomatic focus on humanitarian engagement within the region, 
significant linkage with ODA and a broad interpretation of human security/
freedom from want, and an emphasis on consent and civil society engagement. 
Furthermore, Japan and South Korea have contributed directly to the furtherance 
of human security in ASEAN member countries, but also to its promotion in the 
organization as a whole. This has helped facilitate a transition within the regional 
organization from the ASEAN way of non-interference to a people-centered 
ASEAN.
In July 1998, then Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed that 
ASEAN adopt a policy of flexible engagement, which involved discussions 
of fellow members’ domestic policies. As noted by Pitsuwan himself (2008), 
although flexible engagement was not adopted as a form of enhanced interaction, 
ultimately the new “ASEAN political and security community” came to the 
fore, “which is much more intrusive, much more aggressive, much more alien 
to the ASEAN mental perception than my initial idea in 1998 about flexible 
engagement.”
Bellamy and Drummond (2011, 196) assert that “many Southeast Asian 
states are moving away from the traditional notion of sovereignty… towards 
accepting a localized variant of sovereignty as responsibility” that allows for 
criticism of domestic policies and limited diplomatic pressure in the event of 
humanitarian crises. Likewise, Caballero-Anthony and Haywood (2010, 7) have 
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noted a gradual shift in attitudes towards the principles of state sovereignty 
and non-interference, with “regional” security concerns at times outweighing 
concerns over “interference.” They concluded that “the ‘ASEAN way’ is not an 
entirely static concept and what is considered interference in the domestic affairs 
of a country is an ever-widening notion” (ibid., 5).
This movement has culminated in the notion of a “people-centred ASEAN” 
first introduced in the declaration of Bali Concord II signed on October 2003. 
The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) for 2004-2010, a six-year plan designed 
to initiate ASEAN community building comprising three pillars—Economic, 
Security, and Socio-Cultural Community—also emphasized ASEAN’s people-
centered approach (ASEAN 2004, 16). The term was further prioritized when 
ASEAN leaders, in their meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, decided that the time 
had come for the organization to begin its process of transformation through 
an ASEAN Charter (Morada 2008). Based on the 2004 VAP, the leaders agreed 
to confer ASEAN a legal personality by drafting an ASEAN Charter that would 
serve as a constitution of ASEAN (ASEAN 2005). At the Twelfth ASEAN Summit 
in January 2007, in a speech entitled “One Caring and Sharing Community,” 
President of the Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stressed that “the ASEAN 
community we are building shall be a community of peoples caring for and 
sharing their human, natural and cultural resources and strengths for their 
common good and mutual benefit” (ASEAN 2007).
Although the ASEAN Charter, adopted at the Thirteenth ASEAN summit in 
November 2007, maintains the traditional emphasis on principles of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and non-interference, it adheres to numerous liberal and 
humanitarian notions, such as democratization, the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the empowerment of civil society (ASEAN 2008, 
2). It also emphasizes promoting a people-oriented ASEAN as an approach to be 
implemented in ASEAN’s key areas of cooperation: economic, political-security, 
and socio-cultural. In this regard, the Charter proposes “to promote a people-
oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, 
and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building” 
(ibid., 5).
Although there are caveats concerning the extent of human security in the 
Charter related to the distinction between people-centered and people-orientated 
(Chandra 2009, 200; Oga 2014), nevertheless, in the ASEAN Community Vision 
2025, adopted at the Twenty-Seventh ASEAN Summit in November 2015, a 
people-centered and people-oriented community was emphasized in order to 
maintain ASEAN as globally active and relevant (ASEAN 2015). The ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 2025 also includes a number of human-centric 
reinforcing elements including a people-oriented and people-centered ASEAN 
(ibid., 5). Since the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and the invigoration of 
subsequent civil society movements, a gradual transformation of ASEAN’s 
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institutional mechanisms into a more people-oriented process has therefore taken 
place.
In fact, ASEAN currently embodies two theoretically conflicting, but 
potentially mutually supportive governance and policy-prioritization prescrip- 
tions: namely human security, as expressed in the concepts of people-centered 
or people-oriented and the ongoing importance of a state-centric, non-
interventionary ASEAN way (Howe and Park 2017, 6). Indeed, ASEAN’s response 
to a range of East Asian non-traditional security issues in recent years, such as the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, the 2003-2004 avian 
flu outbreak, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the impact of cyclone Nargis in 
2008, and most recently the Rohingya crisis, suggests that these new challenges 
have contributed to a realignment of the ASEAN Way (ibid., 12).
Thus, at least in theoretical and policy terms, while the concept of Asian 
values may have been discredited and there has been a degree of convergence in 
the direction of universal norms, there remains a disconnect between Western 
and Asian understandings of these norms and their policy implications, as well 
as an Asian way of conducting the promotion of human security, shared across 
regional actors. The next section addresses how these understandings and policy 
imperatives have played out in the face of some of the biggest regional challenges 
to human security.
East Asian Human Security Promotion in Practice
Despite dramatic progress in economic development, governance, and inter-
state security in Asia, major challenges to human security endure, some of 
which have even been exacerbated by the policy-making processes described 
above. Among the most serious challenges are the enduring legacies of conflict, 
poverty, environmental degradation, and “natural” disasters, which due to the 
contributions of human agency should perhaps be termed “natural-induced 
disasters.” Each of these threatens human security individually, but also interacts 
with the others in a complex web of causality, with the human security of the 
most vulnerable being challenged along several different avenues. The following 
case studies not only highlight ongoing human security challenges in the region, 
but also the consequences of different paradigmatic and regional approaches.
East Timor/Timor-Leste
For Markus Benzing (2005, 297), East Timor stands out as “the most radical 
‘state-building’ exercise the United Nations has engaged in to date, in the most 
literal sense of the word, as the United Nations acted as midwife for a new state.” 
The UN played a vital role in East Timor’s independence by organizing the 1999 
popular consultation, which ended Indonesia’s twenty-four-year occupation. 
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The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), ran from 1999 
until 2002 with the aim of administering the territory, exercising legislative 
and executive authority during the transition period until independence, and 
supporting capacity-building for self-government. At the end of this period, with 
East Timor celebrating the recovery of its independence not only from Indonesia 
but also from the UN administration which followed, the UN felt able to laud its 
own achievements (UN Foundation 2002).
Optimistic assessments of the long-term future stability of East Timor upon 
independence proved, however, to be premature. UN peacekeeping troops had to 
return in 2006 in the guise of the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force 
(ISF) after fighting between sections of East Timorese police and military forces 
led to social and political instability. President José Ramos-Horta was critically 
injured in an armed attack on February 11, 2008, again leading to the Australian 
government sending reinforcements to keep order in response to a request from 
the government of East Timor (Platypus Magazine 2008, 22-23). UN operations 
in East Timor in fact, out of necessity, went far beyond peacekeeping. According 
to Hideaki Asahi (2012, 3-4), in the East Timorese context, “peace-building is 
tantamount to state-building,” with reference to top-down, state-centric processes 
with a structural focus on putting in place the central- and national-level 
institutions of the state.
Despite a pre-existing indigenous system of community governance and 
justice, intervening forces perceived that East Timor lacked experience of self-
rule, effective central government institutions, and laws, regulations, and other 
normative codes of control to bind or unite local communities and citizens. 
Thus, the first task of the international community was seen as being to foster 
the growth of indigenous “national” governance structures, which could 
serve as an overarching framework of state apparatus. Accordingly, therefore, 
Kamalesh Sharma, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of 
the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), immediately 
identified the need to “Start from Scratch,” overlooking the vital need to build on 
indigenous foundations (ibid., 4). This inability of the UN to identify and work 
with local mechanisms and customs undermined the legitimacy of the UN in the 
eyes of the local population.
The manner through which the UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) 
engaged in state-building endeavors in East Timor can also be criticized for 
having fallen short of the UN standards themselves, namely “the respect [the 
UN peacekeeping operation] shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and 
the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon 
perceptions of its legitimacy” (UNPKO 2008, 36-37). Although there were some 
initial successes, “four years after Timor-Leste gained independence, its police 
and army were fighting each other in the streets of Dili. The April-June 2006 crisis 
left both institutions in ruins and security again in the hands of international 
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forces” (ICG 2008, i). International Crisis Group (ICG) traces the roots of the 
2006 violence to decisions taken on the security sector in the years before and 
after independence in 2002 (ibid., 4).
Upon Indonesian withdrawal, the only major functioning security forces 
on the ground in East Timor were associated with the independence struggle, 
most prominently FALINTIL (the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de 
Timor-Leste, or the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor), which 
stayed in cantonment at Aileu in the run-up to the popular consultation, and for 
another seventeen months afterwards, while the UN wondered what to do with it 
(Howe and Uesugi 2016, 93). The unwillingness or inability of the UN to train the 
former guerrillas and integrate them into the new security sector was reflected 
by the fact that FALINTIL was not mentioned in UNSC Resolution 1272, but 
was rather “perceived as a problematic residue of the twenty-four year struggle 
for independence; a view which neglected the popular support and legitimacy 
FALINTIL enjoyed, at least in the eastern provinces” (Kocak 2013, 9). The UN 
administration missed the opportunity to disband FALINTIL, and at the same 
time stored up resentment in their ranks while focusing on developing the police 
forces.
In order to overcome shortcomings in indigenous personnel, UN adminis- 
trators recruited over 350 Eastern Timorese former officers of the Indonesian 
National Police who were given four weeks transitional training. According to 
Hood (2006, 64), the UN’s recruitment of cadets for the PNTL “was marred 
by inadequate consultation with the East Timorese on the force’s composition, 
excessive reliance on former employees of the Indonesian police forces in East 
Timor, and the use of unsatisfactory ‘western’ [i.e. Euro-American] procedures 
for determining candidates’ suitability.”
In a relatively short period of time since regaining independence, Timor-
Leste has developed a comparatively good record of democratic competition 
and has firmly established many of the conditions for a working representative 
democracy. In 2012, the year in which only the tenth anniversary of new-founded 
independence was celebrated, there were three sets of free and fair elections (two 
presidential and one parliamentary) without significant disruption, allowing the 
withdrawal of UN peacekeepers to proceed as scheduled that December (Della-
Giacoma 2012). Yet this may have been despite as much as because of Western 
dominated liberal peacebuilding by the UN. Indeed, UN operations in East 
Timor were often at odds with their indigenous counterparts. The upshot of the 
UN state-building project has been stability but with power concentrated in the 
hands of the few.
In contrast to what is spent on security and state-building projects 
encouraged by the UN which saw 30 percent of the budget allocated to a 
stabilization fund, only 3.98 percent of the budget has been allocated to the 
agricultural sector where over 80 percent of the population is employed, with 
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the same proportion devoted to the health sector while education received 6.64 
percent (Doraisami 2009, 169-70). Readily available funds from resources have 
led to poor planning and management, and currently high levels of expenditure 
have done little to significantly improve infrastructure, are not in line with the 
economy’s absorption capacity, and are unlikely to increase private sector activity 
or employment (ibid., 172).
Both national and international governance agencies have encountered 
severe difficulties in spreading the benefits of economic development much 
beyond the boundaries of the capital. Despite expending US$ 32 million in 2010 
on the Decentralized Development Package aimed at infrastructure development 
in rural communities, critics contended that overall spending was still too 
concentrated in Dili and failed to benefit the 90-plus percent of the population 
living in rural districts (Arnold 2011, 218-19). The Petroleum Fund has given the 
government of Timor-Leste considerable economic freedom of movement but 
spending on economic stimulus measures and improvements to infrastructure 
have produced woeful returns. ICG notes that “in recent years, over half the 
state budget has been devoted to construction projects, but actual execution 
has sometimes seemed an afterthought. Limited investment in the weak 
education and health sectors is not doing enough to ensure the welfare of future 
generations” (ICG 2013).
The nation-building process of Timor-Leste faces significant demographic 
challenges due to a population growth which is the fastest in Asia and among 
the fastest in the world. Timor-Leste also has a distorted demographic curve 
with an early peak and a long tailing-off due to a large younger generation while 
many of the older generation perished during the struggle against Indonesia. 
The average age is only 17.3 years (Asahi 2012, 14). The youth have become 
heavily involved with so-called “martial arts groups,” some of which have taken 
on the characteristics of violent armed gangs (Pawelz 2015, 121). These groups 
have exacerbated and inflamed each crisis since independence, and disrupted 
elections with internecine violence, attacks against the instruments of the state, 
and intimidation and victimization of civil society. Yet the stimulus for Timorese 
youths to join these groups and engage in the destabilizing activities listed above 
is primarily economic, related to a failure of those who govern to provide havens 
free from want for the most vulnerable sections of society. Timor-Leste has a 
“shockingly high” unemployment rate, particularly among the youth (Guterres 
2008, 368). Ten to fifteen thousand unemployed youths are added to these figures 
annually (Akara 2011).
Domestic violence continues to be an issue in independent Timor-Leste, is 
the most common form of gender-based violence reported to the police, and, 
according to a baseline study in two Timorese districts published in 2009, is a 
“normal” occurrence for many Timorese women and often viewed as a private 
or family matter (Timor Leste Government 2011, 50). In 2009 domestic violence 
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was entered in the penal code, making it a punishable crime for the first time, and 
also a public crime, which means people other than the victim have the power to 
report incidents of domestic violence to the police. “The recognition of domestic 
violence as a crime made it possible for the National Parliament to pass a long-
awaited Law Against Domestic Violence in May 2010” (ibid.). Since the passing of 
the law, however, continued obstacles such as “lack of rule of law, a feeble judicial 
system, economic dependence, and a culture of silence” mean that it remains the 
country’s number one crime, accounting for around 50 percent of all crimes, and 
with nearly one-third of all women having experienced some form of violence 
or assault since the age of fifteen rising to one in two in the capital, Dili (Hodal 
2012). Rita Reddy (2011), Senior Gender Advisor to UN Mission in Timor-Leste 
(UNMIT), noted that not only has conflict delayed women’s advancement in 
Timor-Leste—and that the androcentric, patriarchal, overwhelmingly Catholic 
and conservative traditional society continues to place obstacles in front of 
them—but also that poverty, unemployment, gangs, and martial arts clubs are 
further endangering women.
In short, despite the nominal positive outlook, the credibility of the UNMIT 
as a security provider and interim law enforcer in East Timor was compromised. 
The 2006 upheavals suggested that rather than the success claimed by many 
commentators, initial state-building operations carried out under first UNTAET 
and then UNMISET were a failure (although the 2007 elections were mostly 
peaceful, they were extremely divisive). Despite the peaceful 2012 elections, and 
the withdrawal of the overwhelming majority of external mission personnel, the 
underlying foundations for long-term peace, stability, and development, have yet 
to have been fully laid. Toward the end of its term, faced with growing frustration 
of the Timorese leadership and their sense of national pride against the 
usurpation of sovereignty and imposition of governance structures, the legitimacy 
of the UNMIT eroded in the eyes of host population, further undermining its 
efficacy (Howe and Uesugi 2016, 11). The government of East Timor did not 
perceive the ongoing hosting of UN missions to be to its advantage, and thus 
did not extend its consent to continuing intrusion of its sovereignty by UNMIT. 
The lack of a development, freedom from want, and distributive justice focus has 
stored up human security challenges for the future. Thus, in general, a universalist 
approach which failed to take into account the roles and perspectives of domestic 
constituencies proved to be somewhat limited in promoting human security in 
the long-term.
Furthermore, Australia, the major external state actor in East Timor, 
although a regional power, has consistently demonstrated a Western perspective 
in dealing with regional challenges. Australia has been regarded as a “traditional 
middle power” at both the global and regional level, basing its foreign policy 
behavior on multilateralism and soft power while still reflecting the Concert of 
Europe Model in which smaller powers construct their identity relative to the 
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great powers in the West. At the global level, Australia has avidly supported 
multilateral institutionalism, chairing the UN Security Council (UNSC) through 
2013-14 and hosting the G20 in 2014. At the regional level, “engagement with 
Asia” has become a central theme in Australian public policy and in public debate 
about Australia’s place in the world (Capling 2008, 601). Australian-led projects in 
the region have focused on food consumer protection, education, and population, 
with an emphasis on trade and investment promotion, market access, generalized 
system of preferences privileges, and aviation issues. Moreover, the ASEAN-
Australia Business Council for the private sector was established to complement 
the governmental-level cooperation initiatives (ASEAN Secretariat 1988).
Wilkins (2014) argues that the key purpose of this multilateralism and 
coalition-building as features of middle-power diplomacy is to forge and reinforce 
a liberal global and regional order conducive to Australia’s security and prosperity. 
Prime Minister Rudd (2011) declared that “we seek to build and strengthen the 
global and regional rules-based order.” Adler and Barnett (1998, 425) note that 
“Australia’s attempt to convince its neighbors of the virtues of open regionalism, 
multilateralism, and market-led integration may also be considered as a case of 
attempted (though not quite successful) redefinition of the parameters of politics 
that are designed to make Asia safe for Australia.” Successive governments have 
sought to mediate tensions between the powers. The “Australia in the Asian 
Century White Paper” (Australian Government 2012) declares that Australia “will 
promote cooperative arrangements among major powers in the region as the 
economic and strategic landscape shifts.” In the words of Prime Minister Rudd 
(2011), “Australia sees itself as a middle power with global and regional interests.”
Australia’s role in Timor-Leste, therefore, has reflected self-imaging as a 
supporter of universal institutions, a Western freedom from fear perspective 
on human security and peacebuilding, and a trade and investment rather than 
development focus on freedom from want. Indeed, Canberra has repeatedly 
sought to maximize its own economic benefit at the expense of Timor-Leste, 
including siphoning off billions of dollars in revenue from the exploitation of 
contested oil and gas fields. Australia even illegally spied and bugged the Timorese 
delegation during negotiations on the maritime demarcation of the Timor Gap 
(continental shelf principle of mid-way line). Beeson (2019) has highlighted the 
irony, or perhaps hypocrisy, of Australia’s position as one of the most outspoken 
and prominent supporters of the “rules-based international order” while flouting 
the rules when doing so is judged to be in the national interest, with the “most 
diplomatically embarrassing example of this…seen in Australia’s treatment of its 
impoverished neighbor Timor-Leste.”
On the other hand, although this case study demonstrates the shortcomings 
of Western and universalist perspectives on human security and peacebuilding, 
it also reflects the limitations of the Asian way. The East Timor humanitarian 
interventions did represent an early case of involvement of East Asian actors 
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in PKOs; a human security-related policy arena within which there has been 
significant growth of regional interest and activity (Howe and Kondoch 2014). 
For the first time in history Japan sent its military personnel, albeit engineering 
units, to a UN peace operation. Other Asian and non-Western actors such as 
South Korea, Bangladesh, Fiji, Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia also contributed their 
troops to UNTAET. Even China sent a symbolic contribution of peace personnel. 
Japan, South Korea, and China have continued to be major “no strings attached” 
donors to Timor-Leste since independence and the ending of the UN missions.
Yet ASEAN’s performance with regard to human security promotion in this 
case study has been mixed at best. During the Indonesian occupation of East 
Timor, ASEAN and its other members were reluctant to criticize one of their 
number for undermining the human security of vulnerable individuals and 
groups—the ASEAN Way was in full force. Even after Timorese independence, 
however, and Indonesian acquiescence in the matter, other member states, in 
particular Singapore, placed obstacles in the way of full Timorese membership 
and the human security and development benefits which would thereby be 
achieved. This obstructionism is due to the perceived financial and organizational 
burdens which would accrue to the organization and its existing members.
The ASEAN explanation is that with more than a thousand ASEAN meetings 
a year Timor-Leste simply lacks the capacity to participate fully. It would seem 
to this author, however, that rather than exclude a country from the benefits of 
full membership in the regional body, the answer to the dilemma lies in building 
capacity in Timor-Leste. This represents an avenue for human security promotion 
which could be profitably pursued by the Northeast Asian agencies (Japan and 
South Korea) which already contribute significantly to capacity- and institution-
building in ASEAN itself and in other challenging cases.
Thus, the case of East Timor demonstrates how lack of consent or ownership 
for recipient parties can be a major hindrance to furthering human security and 
capacity-building in challenging East Asian operating environments. The same 
conditions can also be found in the next case, governance failure in Myanmar, 
and the shortcomings of international responses.
Myanmar
Myanmar (also known as Burma) is a resource rich emerging economy in 
Southeast Asia but remains one of the poorest countries in the region. It has been 
and continues to be subject to conflicting external pressures from the East and 
West. Since independence from Britain in 1948, Myanmar has also experienced a 
complex set of conflicts between governments and people. Thus, both exogenous 
and endogenous governance challenges abound. For Smith (2007, 3) the country 
stands out as “a pre-eminent example of a post-colonial state subsumed in what 
development analysis describes as a ‘conflict trap.’” Facing many challenges, 
including ethnic insurgencies and remnants of colonial experience, successive 
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governments have adopted state-centric national security policies with an 
emphasis on national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the national unity of 
diverse ethnic nationalities. Such policies have often impacted negatively on the 
human security of the most vulnerable and opened the governments of Myanmar 
to external criticism.
For the entirety of the period of military dominated governance, Myanmar 
could be considered a “severe” fragile state. During this time, the country faced 
the double challenge of underdevelopment and human insecurity and was also 
considered a difficult development partner due to its lack of political will to 
alleviate poverty (DAC 2001). As a result of such governance failure, Western 
actors not only withdrew assistance to the country, but also imposed significant 
sanctions.
By contrast, Japan has consistently featured as the largest aid donor to 
Myanmar and continued to provide assistance despite unacceptable behavior 
by the military government. Since the start of the military government in 1962, 
Myanmar has relied heavily on Japanese foreign aid (Oishi and Furuoka 2003, 
898). Tokyo’s ODA to Myanmar rapidly increased from the latter half of the 
1970s when the military government relaxed its strict neutralist foreign policy 
and opened up to more ODA in order to overcome the country’s economic and 
political crisis of the mid-1970s. The onset of the second military administration 
in 1988 undermined this favorable relationship, as Japan suspended its ODA on 
account of the junta’s poor human rights record and delay in democratization. 
Tokyo did, however, recognize the military regime, and resumed economic 
assistance to the government of Myanmar the very next year. This was despite the 
fact, and perhaps because of it, that Myanmar’s human security and development 
conditions worsened dramatically following the coup, and the military’s atrocities 
against minority insurgencies were even more dreadful than they had been under 
the previous regime (Smith 1999). Tokyo’s reasoning was that resumption of 
economic assistance was necessary to protect people and to ensure the survival 
and dignity of individuals as human beings.
It was, however, governance failure in the face of a natural disaster which 
truly drew international attention, but also exposed the extent of the schism 
between the Western and Asian paradigms of human security and R2P. Cyclone 
Nargis, which impacted Myanmar in early May 2008, was the deadliest storm to 
ever hit the country, and one of the most devastating recorded anywhere. Cyclone 
Nargis officially killed more than 140,000 people, although some commentators 
put the death toll at over 300,000 (UNEP 2009, 3). The government of Myanmar 
was accused of providing many affected people with almost no relief assistance 
while at the same time hampering external assistance (Özerdem 2010, 693).
The military leader of the country Senior General Than Shwe’s major 
contribution in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis was to declare that the 
country was capable of handling the relief effort, but that it would allow limited 
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international assistance so long as “no strings were attached” (Stover and Vinck 
2008, 729). Yet this was a gross over-estimation of the capacity of the government 
of Myanmar to address the humanitarian crisis, and an under-estimation of the 
limitations which would be placed upon international assistance. It was not until 
May 6 that the regime agreed to accept any foreign assistance. This agreement 
was still limited and did not lead to the huge and timely influx of international 
assistance needed. The government insisted on being able to control any 
distribution of aid which would ultimately be allowed in, following which it was 
“slow to issue visas to foreign specialists and to allow aid into Myanmar” (ibid). In 
fact, the government did not allow international experts and cargo ships with aid 
goods into its territory for several weeks (Kapucu 2011, 12). Even when this was 
somewhat relaxed, the government made it clear that only “friendly” countries 
would be allowed into Myanmar, denying naval vessels loaded with aid supplies 
from the United States, Britain, and France permission to land in Myanmar or to 
deliver any supplies by helicopter (Selth 2008, 388).
Western commentators and actors were overwhelmingly critical of the 
government of Myanmar, even to the extent of advocating intervention. Madeleine 
Albright (2008), the former U.S. Secretary of State thought the government to 
be criminally neglectful in its response. Gareth Evans (2008), president of the 
International Crisis Group from 2000 to 2009, one of the architects of the R2P, 
and a former Foreign Minister of Australia, reflected on whether it was “time for 
an aid invasion.” Jean-Maurice Ripert, the French ambassador to the UN, used 
the language of R2P to attack the government of Myanmar (Özerdem 2010, 699), 
as did Bernard Kouchner, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who called on 
the UNSC to pass a resolution authorizing the delivery of aid even if this meant 
imposing it on the government of Myanmar in violation of state sovereignty 
(Barber 2009, 4). Specifically, Kouchner suggested that the R2P doctrine should 
be invoked as a response to the junta’s refusal to allow international aid operations 
in the country, while it was failing to meet those needs through its own means.
This position found support among such Western human security pioneers 
as Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and driving force 
behind the ICISS, and Allan Rock, who was Canada’s Ambassador to the UN 
(Özerdem 2010, 702). European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Javier Solana 
agreed the UN should use “all means necessary” to ensure that aid reached the 
most vulnerable, German sources indicated forcible delivery of assistance might 
be considered (Selth 2008, 390), and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband 
asserted the R2P could be applied to situations of natural disaster, further 
claiming that it is in fact a legal requirement of international governance (Barber 
2009, 33). Australia’s former Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, agreed that 
“the concept of responsibility to protect needs to be extended to humanitarian 
assistance” while Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said the world needed to “bash the 
doors down in Burma” (ibid.).
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Pressure from the West over this issue, however, experienced considerable 
pushback from the non-Western sources. UNSC Permanent Members Russia and 
China, supported by some other Asian powers, argued that as the country was 
affected by a natural disaster, it would be better not to politicize the situation any 
further, but that rather it was the domestic affair of a sovereign state to decide 
how to assist its own people (Özerdem 2010, 701). There was something of an 
Asian consensus that such an “aid invasion” would amount to a gross violation of 
the sovereignty of Myanmar and went beyond the remit of the R2P. “Predictably, 
this was also the view of the [Myanmar government]” (Selth 2008, 390). Non-
Western members of the ICISS also rejected the interpretations expounded 
by colleagues from the West. Ramesh Thakur argued that “there would be no 
better way to damage responsibility to protect beyond repair… than to have 
humanitarian assistance delivered into Myanmar backed by Western soldiers 
fighting in the jungles of Southeast Asia again” (Barber 2009, 10).
Meanwhile, as the West struck political postures, neighboring Asian countries, 
which were ultimately trusted by the government of Myanmar (after international 
pressures), were already delivering disaster response assistance. These included 
Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Indonesian and Singaporean disaster relief teams 
helping in search and rescue, mass care, medical relief, and other operations. 
Singaporean leadership facilitated the effective intervention of ASEAN through 
a tripartite ASEAN-UN-Myanmar government joint task force to coordinate, 
facilitate, and monitor international disaster relief assistance (Kapuchu 2011, 12). 
This case, therefore, threw a spotlight on the highly polarized and political nature 
of discussion related to both human security in general, and the R2P in particular.
Asian states were willing and able to provide international leadership in 
reaction to a humanitarian catastrophe in the region. John Holmes (2008), 
the UN’s senior representative during the emergency, has noted that ASEAN’s 
leadership was vital in building trust with the government and saving lives. 
Özerdem (2010, 704) further comments that the regional body spearheaded the 
aid effort. On May 15, 2008, fifty-one national representatives gathered at the 
ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference on Cyclone Nargis where they 
agreed to form an ASEAN-led Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to assess impact and 
immediate humanitarian assistance as well as medium- to longer-term recovery 
needs. Özerdem (ibid., 704-05) claims that it was the prospect of this agreement 
that led to Than Shwe accepting Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to open Myanmar’s 
borders.
ASEAN’s involvement and leadership made external interference more 
palatable (despite previous ASEAN criticism over Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
Saffron Revolution). In the case of governance failure in Myanmar, therefore, the 
combination of Western interventionary pressures, with Asian non-judgmental 
engagement, created the best conditions to facilitate governance transformation 
within a target state. Pressure from the West creates incentives not only for the 
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target state to accept help, but also for Asian actors to offer it; while Asian offers 
of assistance are more readily accepted due to their anti-interventionary legacy.
The impact and aftermath of Nargis demonstrated the ongoing challenges 
posed by sovereignty issues and national security prioritization to the promotion 
of human security in Myanmar, and indeed the wider East Asian region. Hence 
Japan’s focus on non-state-centric engagement, community-based peacebuilding, 
human security promotion, and disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilience 
holds particular promise especially in crisis and disaster response scenarios. 
The Japanese approach has included providing massive financial assistance and 
currency swap arrangements in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis to 
stabilize the regional economies and strengthen social and political stability. 
The country has engaged in peacebuilding in Cambodia, East Timor, Aceh, and 
Mindanao, and has been the largest provider of services in the conflict-affected 
regions of Myanmar (riven with ethnic, religious, and separatist confrontations 
between armed groups and the national military forces).  Japan offered financial 
and medical assistance when East Asia was hit by the SARS epidemic; and 
deployed the largest contingent of Japanese troops since the end of World War II 
for humanitarian assistance to tsunami-stricken Aceh in early 2005 (Lam 2006, 
143). Japan has, in fact, contributed the greatest amount of financial support to 
countries suffering from natural disasters (ibid.).
Japan has further contributed to capacity and resilience building in Myanmar. 
In 2012, the government of Myanmar expounded its vision of a centralized 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and welcomed international assistance 
to help it succeed in its vision. It became operational in 2015, just in time for 
the calamitous floods and landslides which stuck the country towards the end 
of the year. Despite twelve to fourteen regions and 1.6 million people being 
affected in five major events, and the EOC only recently having come on line, 
the coordinated response stood in stark contrast to Nargis. For sixty-seven days 
the EOC was able to carry out 24-hour situational monitoring, and Don Price, 
Incident Management Advisor and the EOC Chief Coordinator, was able to claim 
that this time no lives were lost as a result of bad management (Price 2016). Three 
ASEAN emergency response teams were quickly deployed, as well as one from 
UNDAC, with twelve UN agencies being involved with crucial roles carried out 
by the JICA(Japan International Cooperation Agency)-installed early warning 
system and very capable JICA project advisors on the ground (ibid.).
In total 316 travel authorizations were issued to any flood affected part of the 
country within four to twenty-four hours, as opposed to the two weeks which was 
previously the norm. The human security focus is clear from the list and order of 
SOP and guidelines displayed prominently in the EOC, to be referred to for all 
operational decision-making: RESPONSE—Save Life, Reduce Suffering, Protect 
Property, Protect Environment; RECOVERY—Livelihoods, Social Protection, 
Most Vulnerable Groups (Howe 2018, 126-27). For Price (2016), the level of 
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local civil and military expertise and experience, combined with increased 
technological and organizational coordination, could now make Myanmar a 
benchmark for ASEAN. 
Many of the sovereignty issues have significantly been resolved, with an 
increased receptiveness to international assistance manifesting even before the 
opening and eventual transformation of the regime. But national security and 
development continues to be prioritized at the expense of human-centered 
perspectives. Despite successive waves of people empowerment, first, in the 
immediate aftermath of Nargis, second, with the 2010 constitutional and 
governmental change, third, with the breakthrough in negotiations between 
the government, the military, and the NLD in 2011, and most recently with the 
election victory of the NLD in 2015, the most vulnerable sections of society 
remain endangered, under-empowered, and significantly without voice. This has 
become abundantly clear in the ongoing Rohingya crisis.
Again, with regard to international engagement with the government 
of Myanmar over the Rohingya, we can see the divergent Asian and Western 
paradigms at work. The United States has followed a traditional Western 
perspective on the crisis noting that the government of Myanmar needs to 
respect the rule of law, stop the violence, and end the displacement of civilians 
(USAID 2018).  Canada has likewise reflected such a perspective, reaffirming a 
commitment “to advancing our core values in the pursuit of democracy, human 
rights, freedoms, and the rule of law,” and imposing targeted sanctions against 
Major-General Maung Maung Soe (Canadian Government 2018). Meanwhile, 
China has followed the Asian non-interventionary, development-focused 
approach to safeguarding the human security of the most vulnerable, calling on 
the international community to “support the efforts of Myanmar in safeguarding 
the stability of its national development” (Osborne 2017).
Given, as detailed above, Japan is already heavily engaged in the promotion 
of human security in Myanmar, the Rohingya crisis would seem to present an 
important “noble opportunity” for South Korea to do something that is both 
normatively right and beneficial to others, while also in its national interest (Lee 
2014, 2-3). The ROK has shown a willingness to pursue policies relevant to the 
promotion of human security in Myanmar which could come into play in any 
attempt by Seoul to address the Rohingya crisis. South Korea has consistently 
concentrated 30 percent of its total ODA to members of the ASEAN. The 
ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund, established in 1990 and having expended US$ 
81million through the end of 2016, operates with an annual budget of US$ 7 
million serves to fund developmental projects dealing with technology transfer, 
human resource development, people to people exchanges, and exchanges of 
intellectuals between Korea and ASEAN (ASEAN-ROK). In 2010, in accordance 
with “the Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation,” the Korean 
government formulated Country Partnership Strategies for twenty-four priority 
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partner countries in order to maximize synergy effects and to improve ODA 
effectiveness through strategic concentration (ODA Korea 2012b). The largest 
geographical concentration of priority countries was in Asia (eleven countries), 
with six ASEAN Member states including Myanmar (Howe and Park 2019, 131).
The Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul has shown considerable enthusiasm 
for human security promoting policies. According to the 100 Policy Tasks Five-
Year Plan, the New Northern Policy, and the companion New Southern Policy, 
are a part of the Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility project which 
aims to build a sustainable regional system of cooperation with ASEAN, the 
“middle power” grouping of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, 
and Argentina), India, and Northeast Asian states. In particular, the “New 
Southern Policy” seeks to elevate the relationship between South Korea and 
ASEAN countries, as well as India, to the same level as the one between the ROK 
and its four strategic neighbors—the United States, Russia, China, and Japan 
(ibid., 118). Unfortunately, however, initiatives from successive administrations 
in Seoul to expand human security promoting engagement with Southeast Asia 
repeatedly come up against the challenges and distractions of realpolitik in 
Northeast Asia. As long as Seoul’s policy elites remain focus on the traditional 
security considerations of the New Northern Policy, the human security aspects 
of the New Southern Policy will labor in its shadow.
Thus, although the combination of Western pressure and Asian engagement 
has significantly transformed governance and human security in Myanmar, the 
case study also demonstrates the need for the two approaches to be pursued in 
tandem. If this is not done, it seems that both paradigms are liable to fail in the 
objective of promoting human security in East Asia, as can be seen in the case 
study of North Korea.
North Korea
Since its inception in 1948, the regime at the helm of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has neglected its duties to protect or guarantee 
minimal human security conditions for its citizens and has resisted becoming 
an international norm-abiding state. Human rights conditions have deteriorated 
significantly in the face of both endogenous and exogenous crises. Internal and 
external policy and governance failures have negatively impacted the daily lives 
of citizens, making them ever more insecure, as well as denying them the most 
fundamental human rights. Although largely the architect of its own internal 
insecurity dilemma, North Korea has been disadvantaged by developments in 
its international operating environment, fostering a belief in the need for, or 
justification of, policies that further undermine human security such as juche 
(self-reliance) and songun (military first).
Due to the externalization of internal insecurity by the Pyongyang regime, 
combined with flagrant human rights abuses within the country, North Korea has 
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drawn significant international attention. Western and Asian actors have pursued 
a variety of strategies aimed at changing government policies in the DRPK in 
order to protect neighboring states, and to provide safe havens for the people of 
North Korea. The DPRK has promised repeatedly to abide by international rules, 
norms, and conventions, been punished for failing to live up to these promises, 
and then failed to amend its behavior in response to the punishments. The 
North Korean Human Rights Resolution has been adopted by the UN General 
Assembly every consecutive year since 2005 (Baek 2013, 123). The United States 
aggressively tackled the problem with the passage of the controversial North 
Korean Human Rights Act in 2004 (Howe 2006). But much of the focus of the 
international community, in particular in the West, has been on how to deal with 
the international threat posed by the DPRK rather than that which Pyongyang 
poses to its own people.
After North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the UNSC immediately 
adopted Resolution 1718, which imposed a series of economic and commercial 
sanctions on the DPRK (Havel, Bondevik, and Wiesel 2008, 17). North Korea 
agreed to a complete shutdown of its nuclear reactor in February 2007, but then 
conducted a second nuclear test in May 2009, violating the agreement. The UNSC 
issued statements of concern and criticism, and on June 12, 2009 passed UNSC 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 condemning Pyongyang’s actions, increasing existing 
sanctions, while adding some new provisions aimed at curtailing the regime’s 
nuclear activities. In response to UNSCR 1874 Pyongyang asserted that “it has 
become an absolutely impossible option for North Korea to even think about 
giving up its nuclear weapons” (Fackler 2009). Indeed, a third nuclear test took 
place in February 2013. Despite little evidence of the success of such measures, 
the UNSC responded with Resolution 2094, further condemning North Korean 
actions and supposedly further tightening the sanctions regime.
Nolan (2008, 76) has, however, referred to the “non-impact” of UN sanctions 
imposed against the DPRK. Despite some disruption of economic activities in 
North Korea, they had little impact on the central decision-making core of the 
regime due to ongoing partial engagement with Beijing. Primarily, the impact 
of this sanctions regime, as with most others, has not been to effectively coerce 
the decision-making elites into behaving in a way that is acceptable to the 
international community, but rather to negatively impact the lower rungs of 
North Korean society.
Yet the unilateral development-led incentivization projects of successive 
South Korean governments also failed adequately to change North Korean 
policy-making or provide significantly better human security for the most 
vulnerable in North Korea. In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung 
initiated a positive engagement policy towards the DPRK called the “Sunshine 
Policy,” which emphasized reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides 
(Kim 1999, 12, 64-65). In pursuit of these goals, the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
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government provided the DPRK hundreds of thousands of tons of maize, flour, 
and chemical fertilizer with no pre-conditions (Chae 2001, 7). Learning from 
previous experiences, Seoul adopted practical operating principles such as “Easy 
tasks first, difficult tasks later,” “Economy first, politics later,” “Non-governmental 
organizations first, government later,” and “Give first, take later” (Moon 2012, 
26). Even with the souring of relations between the DPRK and ROK’s patron, the 
United States, the Kim Dae-jung administration never stopped aiding the North. 
The Roh Moo-hyun administration’s “Peace and Prosperity Policy” largely 
inherited the main tenets of the Sunshine Policy. But the mounting tension 
between the United States and the DPRK over the nuclear issue and criticisms 
from conservative sectors of the South Korean public over sending aid without 
pre-conditions caused the new government to put greater emphasis on the 
principle of reciprocity than the previous administration had done (Koh 
2005, 203-04). The Roh Moo-hyun Administration nevertheless tried to avoid 
damaging the improved inter-Korean relationship by pledging to supply 500,000 
tons of food and 300,000 tons of fertilizer per annum. Following this, the ROK 
government granted 400,000 tons of rice on loan terms, sent 300,000 tons of 
fertilizer directly, and provided 100,000 tons of maize through the World Food 
Program (WFP) in 2003 and 2004 (Kim 2005, 16). In 2003, the ROK government 
also managed to persuade the United States to reach out to North Korea through 
a multilateral initiative to resolve the nuclear crisis: the “Six-Party Talks.”
Responding to an appeal from the North Koreans to provide fertilizer in 
2005, the South Korean government asked them to hold the inter-Korean vice-
ministerial meetings in return, ultimately leading to the vice-ministerial meeting 
in May 2005. The ROK sent 350,000 tons of fertilizer and provided 500,000 
tons of rice on loan terms in exchange in 2005 (MOU 2005, 174). Progress was, 
however, set back almost immediately by the Banco Delta Asia scandal resulting 
in the United States freezing North Korean funds after accusing the DPRK of 
counterfeiting and laundering U.S. dollars. In July, North Korea conducted 
ballistic missile tests followed by another nuclear test in October 2006 (Ur-
Rehman 2010, 10). After the missile tests, the ROK government suspended a food 
loan and the delivery of 100,000 tons of rice which had been pledged to North 
Korean flood victims in 2006 (Moon 2011, 21, 155). 
On February 14, 2007, the Six-Party Talks progressed towards an agreement 
to implement a first phase of the September 19 Joint Statement, which caused 
the South Korean government to resume aid to the North. In 2007, the ROK 
government provided 400,000 tons of rice in the form of a loan, as well as 300,000 
tons of fertilizer and 44,000 tons of food aid through the WFP (Gyeonggi 2012, 
340; Moon 2011, 18). As the inter-Korean relationship improved, the Second 
Inter-Korean Summit was held in October 2007 between Kim Jong-il and Rho 
Moo-hyun. In the October 4 South-North Joint Declaration, announced on the 
final day of the summit, North Korea and South Korea reaffirmed the spirit of the 
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June 15 Declaration and showed their willingness to build peace on the Korean 
peninsula through international relations and their economic cooperation with 
one other (Korea Times 2007).
Ultimately, however, with growing exasperation in the South at the 
intransigence of Pyongyang and the discrediting of unconditional assistance, the 
Lee Myung-bak administration in Seoul reverted to a more coercive engagement 
with the North, linking assistance with verifiable progress on certain key issues. 
Park Geun-hye’s administration also effectively abandoned the unilateral 
benevolence approach to dealing with the crisis of governance in the DPRK. 
Assistance ground to a virtual stop.
The WFP (2019, 4) estimates that 10.1 million people (40 percent of the 
population) remain food insecure and in urgent need of food assistance. “Since 
January 2019, rations of the Public Distribution System (PDS) have been reduced 
to 300 grams per person per day (g/pp/day), which compares to 380 grams 
during the same period in 2018” and they may decline further (ibid.). Pyongyang 
has acknowledged that the country is suffering its worst drought in thirty-seven 
years and has called on its citizens to “battle” against the crop damage caused by 
it (BBC 2019b). The latest report of the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in the DPRK identified that the regime has violated 
economic, social, and cultural rights, not to mention the civil and political 
rights of their citizens (UNHRC 2019). North Korea has been described as the 
world’s biggest open prison camp, with, according to a report by the U.S. State 
Department, between 80,000 and 120,000 people in prison (BBC 2019a). The 
condition of many prisoners in detention camps in the DPRK remains a critical 
issue (OHCHR 2017; BBC 2018).
Engagement with the DPRK by other Asian actors has been patchy at best. 
From Japan’s perspective, there have been attempts to promote simultaneously 
traditional and non-traditional security in Northeast Asia through economic 
engagement and development cooperation. This was the rationale behind the 
huge amount of Japanese ODA disbursements to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) during the last two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade 
of the twenty-first century (Howe 2013, 193). It was also the rationale behind 
Japan’s participation in the Six Party Talks and the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO), an organization founded on March 15, 1995 
to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework freezing DPRK 
nuclear power plant development in return for the construction of two light water 
reactor nuclear power plants. Both of these entities, however, founded on the 
realpolitik and power hierarchies of Northeast Asia, according to which Japan, 
sometimes described as a “reactive state,” was particularly vulnerable (Calder 
1998; 2005).
For ASEAN, the major vehicle for engagement with North Korea has been 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial 
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Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore on July 23-25, 1993, 
agreed to establish the ARF, and the inaugural meeting was held in Bangkok on 
July 25, 1994. The objectives were outlined as being: 1) to foster constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and 
concern; and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN Regional 
Forum). Importantly, not only did this organization represent a rare multilateral 
security institution which bridged Northeast and Southeast Asia, but it also 
included the participation of the DPRK. ASEAN, the embodiment of the ASEAN 
Way and non-interventionary perspectives of human security promotion, was to 
be in the driving seat. Again, however, this approach foundered on the rocks of 
Northeast Asian realpolitik. The significantly larger and more powerful (at least 
in traditional terms) states of Northeast Asia have proven unwilling to delegate 
collective action problem solving to their partners in Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
ASEAN and its members have enough problems to deal with in Southeast Asia 
(Chong 2018).
It was only with the simultaneous rise to power in early 2017 of Moon Jae-
in in the ROK and Donald Trump in the United States, with their very different 
politics and agendas, that a combination and synchronization of Asian and 
Western approaches led to a reinvigoration of the peacebuilding process on the 
Korean Peninsula and also greater hope for the provision of havens safe from 
fear, want, and indignity in the North. President Moon has achieved startling 
progress in terms of de-escalating rhetoric and conflict in Northeast Asia, has 
built bridges with the North and with China, has initiated unprecedented rounds 
of summit diplomacy, and has successfully recommenced family re-unification 
visits for those divided by the Korean War and partition of the country. Yet this 
was probably only possible because in the form of U.S. President Donald Trump, 
North Korea was faced with an adversary who appeared willing to think and 
do the unthinkable in re-starting the Korean War by striking or even invading 
the DRPK. Such a combination of Asian versus Western engagement has, 
controversially, been likened to a “good cop, bad cop” routine (Martin 2007, 61-
88).
To a great extent, the recent impetus for engagement by the United States 
under Trump, and by the ROK under Moon, has come from a combination of 
national geopolitical interest and domestic political factors. These also help to 
explain why, despite ongoing emphasis on state-centric considerations of security 
and development in the region, East Asian actors are increasingly willing to 




It is clear that even given the near universal acceptance of international 
governance norms revolving around the concepts of human security and the 
responsibility to protect, including explicit endorsement at the UN, there 
remain significant discrepancies in how these norms are interpreted and 
operationalized. At the theoretical level, the fault lines are between narrow and 
broad interpretations of human security, the relationship between human security 
and the R2P, and the extent to which the R2P is permissive of humanitarian 
intervention. At the level of practical policy implementation, these divergent 
approaches have been embodied in Western and Asian initiatives, including 
those of the most active and representative countries and organizations in their 
respective regions.
Yet East Asian actors and commentators have certainly become more engaged 
with the discourse, and this analysis of human security and the R2P in East Asia 
shows that the region is no longer the preserve of Westphalian state-centricity and 
sovereignty it has often been depicted. At the theoretical level, there is something 
of an overlapping consensus on the need for a human-centered approach, and 
the participatory or emancipatory inclusion of vulnerable groups, while at the 
practical implementation level, Western and Asian perspectives can actually end 
up as complimentary and mutually supportive rather than antagonistic. In order 
to address the ongoing crises in the region, both sides have important roles to 
play and need to work together with agencies on the ground to address, first and 
foremost, human vulnerabilities.
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